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Alternative Livelihoods:  
Substance or Slogan? 
Overview 
In recent years Afghanistan has attracted significant international 
attention as the world’s largest producer of opium, with its production 
representing an estimated 50 percent of GDP. Views on how to 
eliminate opium production vary, but considerable emphasis has 
been given to the development of alternative livelihoods for opium 
farmers. However under current conditions in Afghanistan there are 
still strong incentives to cultivate opium poppy: it remains a low-risk 
crop in a high-risk environment for both farmers and traders. While 
most stand to gain something from its cultivation, it is the few that 
gain the most. 
The elimination of opium production in Afghanistan is dependent on 
more than encouraging licit on-farm, off-farm and non-farm income 
opportunities. Critical to the realisation of counter narcotics objectives 
is the achievement of broader development goals, including 
establishment of those institutions required for formal governance, 
promotion of a strong civil society and strengthening of social 
protection mechanisms. The multisectoral nature of the task, targeted 
more at nation-building and reconstruction than solely drug control, 
points to the need for broad ownership of the drug control agenda by 
the full range of national, bilateral, multilateral and non-government 
development actors. 
Given the extent of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, the 
complexity of reasons for its cultivation, and comparative experience 
in other regions such as South-East Asia and Latin America, the 
model of “alternative development” based on discrete area-based 
projects is unlikely to contribute significantly to counter narcotics 
objectives. The emergence of an “alternative livelihoods” approach, 
which seeks to mainstream counter narcotics objectives into national 
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development strategies and programmes, is an attempt to respond to 
the causes of opium poppy cultivation and to create links with the 
wider state-building agenda. 
However there are already a number of dangers evident in the current 
alternative livelihoods response. The term itself, best understood as 
doing “development in a drugs environment”, is profoundly 
unsatisfactory, and allows much to masquerade under the label. 
There are unrealistic expectations of how and when alternative 
livelihoods can be developed, and the concept remains a virtual one 
as the results of this approach are yet to be seen. The push by 
authorities for a sharp decline in opium-cultivated area is in danger of 
establishing a quid pro quo, with an expectation of funding for 
alternative livelihoods on the basis of achievements in decreasing 
opium poppy area. This puts the cart before the horse. 
The establishment of alternative livelihoods as a pillar of the 
government’s counter narcotics strategy confuses means and goals: 
it should be seen as the latter but it is increasingly becoming defined 
as a sector in itself that attracts its own funding, like eradication and 
interdiction. There is a tendency to badge programmes as alternative 
livelihoods, but these programmes are generally not implemented 
together in any given area – consequently the synergies necessary 
for maximising development impact and addressing the multi-
functional role that opium cultivation plays in rural livelihood strategies 
are not developed. Few of these programmes pay much attention to a 
full analysis of the drivers of opium poppy cultivation, and their 
proposed interventions are heavily biased towards areas of high 
potential for agricultural production where opium poppy cultivation is 
not as concentrated. 
This paper seeks to clarify what is required to effectively pursue 
alternative livelihoods as a goal of the counter narcotics strategy. It 
argues for an approach in which conventional development 
interventions are viewed through a counter narcotics lens in order to 
establish how they might impact on the drivers of opium poppy 
cultivation, and how more effective targeting, timing and coordination 
with other programming might together make a serious impact on the 
levels of opium production. 
Pressure to achieve 
quick impact is 
generating unrealistic 
expectations of how 
and when “alternative 
livelihoods” can be 
developed.  
 Briefing Paper Series  Alternative Livelihoods: Substance or Slogan? 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit    3 
I.  The Opium Economy and Livelihoods 
In Afghanistan’s current economic and political 
climate there are distinct advantages to 
cultivating opium poppy. It is a high-value, low-
weight commodity for which there is a demand. 
Opium poppy is so well suited to Afghanistan’s 
climatic conditions that it produces yields of 
opium and morphine that are higher than the 
global average and maximises returns on 
scarce irrigation water. There are sufficient 
returns at each stage of the supply chain and, 
despite Afghanistan’s fractured infrastructure, 
there is a well-linked market in terms of credit, 
purchase, transport and processing. Some 
estimates suggest that for every hectare of 
opium poppy cultivated, as many as 5.6 jobs 
are created in the rural non-farm economy.
1 
The traditional credit system, which provides an 
advance payment on a future crop, has 
increasingly favoured opium poppy cultivation 
over other crops. In areas where opium poppy 
cultivation has become entrenched, access to 
credit is dependent on a farmer’s willingness to 
cultivate opium poppy. The willingness and 
possession of the requisite skills to cultivate 
opium poppy has increasingly determined 
sharecroppers’ access to land, and the rental 
value of land is determined by potential opium 
yield rather than wheat productivity. Under such 
conditions there is no other crop that can 
provide the same range of benefits, and when it 
declines, the opportunities for on-farm income 
will also decline, driving people off the land. 
It is critical to recognise, however, that the 
economic advantages associated with 
cultivating opium poppy differ according to the 
assets that farmers have at their disposal. For 
the relatively few large landowners, opium 
poppy represents a high-value crop that can 
accrue even greater value if it is sold after the 
harvest season when prices rise. Through 
inequitable land tenure arrangements, a 
landowner can accrue up to two thirds of the 
final opium yield (despite contributing only 20 
percent of the total costs of production) and  
                                                 
1 John W. Mellor, 3 March 2005, “Poppies and Agricultural 
Development in Afghanistan”, USAID/RAMP Project, Afghanistan, 
presentation at the World Bank South Asia Rural Development 
Forum. 
purchase opium in advance at rates consider-
ably below the harvest price. This can lead to 
the generation of windfall profits. The position 
for the land poor is quite different. For this 
group, opium poppy is not just a source of 
income: it provides opportunities to access 
land on a sharecropping or tenancy basis as 
well as drawing on the labour supply of the 
household. It provides access to both on-farm 
income and, in the typical mixed cropping 
system practised in Afghanistan (even 
amongst poppy growers), the means of 
producing food crops for household 
consumption. In this way, opium can define 
the “creditworthiness” of the land poor. 
Without it, access to basic food items, 
agricultural inputs and funds for health care 
becomes severely constrained. 
Opium poppy cultivation also creates a 
demand for itinerant labour to weed and 
harvest the crop. Based on UNODC’s 
estimate that 131,000 hectares of opium 
poppy were cultivated in the 2003–04 growing 
season, the crop would have generated 
approximately 46 million labour days of which 
potentially one third
2 would have been for 
hired labour. Where a household has more 
than one male able to follow the staggered 
weeding and harvesting seasons, the off-farm 
income generated from opium poppy can last 
up to five months, and it is usually higher than 
the on-farm income they can earn as a 
sharecropper. 
Given the different roles that opium poppy 
plays within household livelihood strategies, 
replacing only one of these, such as access 
to income, credit or food security, with a licit 
alternative will not be sufficient to eliminate 
opium poppy on a sustainable basis. There 
are no short cuts. If opium poppy is to be 
eliminated, even over a small geographic 
area, a broad-based and multisectoral effort 
is required over a number of years. 
                                                 
2 David Mansfield, December 2004, Diversity and Dilemma: 
Understanding Rural Livelihoods and Addressing the Causes of 
Opium Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar and Laghman, Eastern 
Afghanistan, GTZ Project for Alternative Livelihoods in Eastern 
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II.  From Alternative Development  
to Alternative Livelihoods?
It is widely recognised by drugs and develop-
ment specialists that given the scale and nature 
of the problem in Afghanistan, illicit drug culti-
vation cannot be dealt with in isolation from the 
wider state-building and reconstruction process 
– making it no different from other development 
problems. The more localised area-based 
project approaches of the “alternative develop-
ment” model implemented in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere in the 1980s and 90s were not able 
to address the different motivations and factors 
that influence households in their decision to 
plant opium poppy. Nor could they deal with the 
extent of its cultivation. 
A critical component of the current counter 
narcotics strategy designed to eliminate 
opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is the 
development of “alternative livelihoods”. This 
concept, which at present is an ideal rather 
than representative of actual practice, 
emerged from an analysis of the weaknesses 
of the so-called “alternative development” 
projects of the past, a recognition of the size 
of the opium problem in 2002, and the 
appreciation of the amount of aid allocated to 
reconstruction and development by the 
international community. But there remains 
significant confusion about the meaning and 
distinction between these two terms which 
Box 1 seeks to clarify. 
Box 1: What are the differences between “alternative development” and “alternative livelihoods”? 
  Alternative development  Alternative livelihoods 
Characteristic 
feature 
 Discrete area-based project approach  Mainstreaming of counter narcotics objectives into 
national development strategy and programming 
Problem analysis  Problem definition usually limited to the 
presence of illicit drug crops within a specific 
area 
Analysis of the drivers of the opium poppy 
economy 
Agenda  Primarily reduction of illicit drug crop culti-
vation – treating the symptoms of cultivation 
A wider state-building and development agenda – 
addressing the causes of cultivation 
Actors  Designed and implemented by both national 
and international drug control organisations 
Designed and implemented by development 
actors, coordination and technical support from 
drug control bodies 
Method of 
implementation 
Attempts to replace on-farm income generated 
by coca and opium poppy 
Address the factors that influence households’ 
drug crop cultivation 
Impact 
assessment 
Measured in reduction of hectares of illicit drug 
crop cultivation 
Measured in both human development terms as 
well as drug control indicators; seeks to under-
stand the processes that influence households in 
their shift from illicit to licit livelihoods  
Strengths  Previously the only way of delivering develop-
ment assistance to marginalised illicit drug 
crop-producing areas 
Recognises overlap between development and 
drug control agendas; part of national 
development strategy 
Weaknesses  •  Poor understanding of the process of 
change from licit to illict livelihoods – often 
reduced to adoption of “conditionality 
clause”  
•  Rarely linked to wider national development 
strategy 
•  Ignores broader role of illicit drug crops 
•  Little consideration of key development 
issues, poverty, gender and environment 
•  Danger of being reduced to alternative income 
source projects and ignoring the broader 
institutional issues 
•  Complex to implement 
 Briefing Paper Series  Alternative Livelihoods: Substance or Slogan? 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit    5 
It must be emphasised that the 
merits of the concept of “alternative 
livelihoods” are to date potential 
rather than realised. The political 
pressures to achieve quick 
reductions in the level of opium 
poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 
combined with constraints on 
capacity in the field of drugs and 
development, have curtailed the 
move to the more idealised cross-
sectoral approach supported by the 
“alternative livelihoods” model. 
Like “alternative development”, 
“alternative livelihoods” has come to 
mean different things to different 
people. For many in the develop-
ment community, alternative livelihoods is the 
same as rural livelihoods and a justification for 
business as usual. Implicit in this view is the 
assumption that by enhancing licit livelihood 
opportunities, opium poppy cultivation will 
automatically contract. Evidence from other 
countries indicates this is not always the case, 
and poor design, implementation and weak 
governance have meant licit livelihood 
opportunities and illicit drug crop cultivation 
have continued in parallel, or that cultivation 
has simply relocated elsewhere. 
For some, using the term “alternative 
livelihoods” has opened up new options for 
funding by bodies which may not be critical of 
the development merits of proposed 
interventions as long as they can be seen to 
bring about a reduction (even if not sustained) 
in opium poppy cultivation. For others 
“alternative livelihoods” remains synonymous 
with “alternative development”, where the 
promise of development assistance is generally 
used as a bargaining tool with which to 
negotiate the maximum reductions in levels of  
opium poppy cultivation from communities. In 
this case, success is measured in terms of 
reduction in hectares of opium poppy, rather 
than sustained improvements in the lives and 
livelihoods of rural communities and a 
diminishing dependency on opium as a 
means of accessing income and assets. Such 
practice sees development assistance as 
compensation rather than a means by which 
to promote equitable growth and empower 
the poor. This view requires that regardless of 
development impact and its differentiation by 
socioeconomic group and dependency on 
opium poppy cultivation, where a community 
fails to achieve the levels of reductions in 
opium poppy cultivation required by the 
authorities, assistance can be suspended and 
opium poppy destroyed. The failure to 
address the root causes of illicit drug crop 
cultivation, and in particular to meet the 
needs of the resource poor, means that 
relocation of opium poppy cultivation (and 
illicit drug crop producers) to neighbouring 
areas is an inevitable consequence of such 
practices. 
III.  Changes in Opium Poppy Cultivation in 2005: 
Lessons for Alternative Livelihoods 
Field observations and other reports all point to 
a sharp decline in opium-cultivated area in 
2004–05 compared with the previous season, 
which some have seen as evidence of success 
of the counter narcotics strategy. The causes of 
this are varied, ranging from strong pressures 
not to cultivate (accompanied with the promise 
of development assistance), the threat and 
practice of eradication, concerns over access to 
wheat, previous opium crop failure and 
uncertainty over prices. 
In 2005, the rapid pace of reduction in opium 
poppy cultivation in the provinces of Helmand 
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economic growth, emphasising the 
interlinkages between the illicit and licit 
economies. Following an almost universal 
enforcement of the ban on opium poppy in 
Nangarhar, there have been noticeable 
downturns in opportunities as well as overall 
trade in various sectors, including transport, 
construction and retail. The decline is 
noticeable but less marked in Helmand. 
Attempts to strengthen and diversify the licit 
elements of household livelihood strategies in 
Nangarhar have become all the more difficult 
due to the multiplier effect the ban has had on 
the wider economy. A 95 percent reduction in 
levels of cultivation in the province represents 
potentially 8 million fewer labour days and a 
reduction in a potential of 3.1 million days of 
hired labour. This calculation does not include 
the estimated 5.6 jobs created in the rural non-
farm economy for every hectare of opium 
poppy cultivated.
3 
In 2005, interventions aimed at offsetting the 
income losses that households were expected 
to experience from significant reductions in 
                                                 
3 Mellor, 2005 
opium poppy cultivation mostly came in the 
form of “cash for work”. Although in Helmand 
cash for work combined with employment 
opportunities from continued opium poppy 
cultivation has mitigated migrationary 
pressures, little has been done to address the 
other factors, including those of provincial 
governance, that influence households in their 
decisions to cultivate opium poppy. Short-term 
single-sector project interventions such as cash 
for work are unlikely to achieve much in areas 
where opium poppy has become an integral 
feature of rural livelihood strategies, and where 
poor governance continues to constrain the 
development of the licit economy. 
Moreover, little consideration seems to have 
been given to the varying levels of dependency 
on opium poppy cultivation between different 
socioeconomic groups and areas. In 
Nangarhar, those without land – arguably the 
most dependent on the opium poppy crop (for 
accessing land, credit and food security as well 
as on-farm and off-farm income) – are those 
who have been largely excluded from the very 
development assistance that has been 
provided to offset the losses they have 
experienced due to the ban. There has been 
Box 2: Consequences of the decline in opium poppy production in Nangarhar, 2005 
•  Area of opium poppy cultivation down by an estimated 95% compared to 2003–04. 
•  Reductions in the availability of land and credit to the most vulnerable as well as considerable shortfalls in on-farm,  
off-farm and non-farm income across the province. 
•  Significant downturn in the licit economy due to dramatic reductions in disposable income and fewer employment 
opportunities. 
•  Impact of the cultivation ban felt most in more remote areas where cultivated land is limited, population densities are 
greater and opium poppy cultivation has been most concentrated. 
•  Reductions in expenditure on food and healthcare, even in more prosperous areas and among relatively wealthy 
socioeconomic groups. 
•  Selling of assets including livestock and land, and a growing inability to meet loan repayment schedules on seasonal and 
accumulated debts. Potential for increasing local conflict over debts, absconding and greater concentration of assets in the 
hands of the wealthy and those involved in illicit trade. 
•  Opium poppy most commonly substituted by wheat; shift to high value crops limited to areas close to Jalalabad. Evidence 
of local authorities adding to existing constraints on increased cultivation of horticultural crops (such as access to seeds, 
irrigated land and physical infrastructure) through their control over transport routes and imposition of compulsory 
purchases. 
•  Little relief provided by “cash for work” from the loss of on-farm income derived from opium poppy and the potential five 
months’ employment from weeding and harvesting as an itinerant labourer. 
•  Seasonal urban migration in search of employment with evidence of both wage labour opportunities and wages falling in 
Jalalabad. Growing incidence of permanent migration to Pakistan and expectation that rates will increase once wheat 
harvest is complete. Predictions that continuation of ban for second year will result in increasing numbers of families leaving 
for Pakistan and Iran as they did during Taliban ban of 2001. 
•  Growing political discontent, particularly in more remote areas where licit livelihood opportunities are most scarce – 
potential implications for democratic processes and support for the state. 
Derived from David Mansfield, Pariah or Poverty?: The Opium Ban in the Province of Nangarhar in the 2004–05 Growing Season and Its Impact 
on Rural Livelihood Strategies, GTZ Project for Alternative Livelihoods in Eastern Afghanistan: Internal Document No. 11. 
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little recognition that village shuras, tasked with 
distributing assistance, have generally shared 
inputs such as cash for work, seeds and 
fertiliser in accordance with traditional rules – 
giving priority to those who own land or water 
within the community. Priority has not been 
given to those areas where dependency on 
cultivation is greatest and agricultural develop-
ment potential at its most limited. There is a 
danger that the relatively wealthy, both in terms 
of assets and households who are least 
dependent on opium poppy, have gained 
preferential access to the benefits of project 
assistance – which seems to satisfy neither 
pro-poor nor counter narcotics objectives.
4 
                                                 
4 David Mansfield, Pariah or Poverty?: The Opium Ban in the 
Province of Nangarhar in the 2004–05 Growing Season and Its 
Impact on Rural Livelihood Strategies, GTZ Project for Alternative 
Livelihoods in Eastern Afghanistan: Internal Document No. 11. 
Bearing in mind the time that it takes to deliver 
the kind of sustainable, well-targeted develop-
ment assistance required to promote equitable 
economic growth and reduce illicit drug crop 
cultivation in an environment such as 
Afghanistan, it has not been possible to 
achieve much in improving access to credit, 
diversifying agricultural incomes and creating 
the non-farm income opportunities that are 
essential for a sustainable reduction in opium 
poppy cultivation. This year’s experiences in 
Helmand and Nangarhar demonstrate the need 
for a more comprehensive and long-term 
approach that addresses the socioeconomic, 
environmental and political causes of opium 
poppy cultivation within a wider national 
development strategy.
 
Box 3: Consequences of the decline in opium poppy production in Helmand, 2005 
•  Area of opium poppy cultivation down by 30–40%. 
•  Downturn but not a collapse in the rural economy. 
•  Numbers of migrant labourers and sharecroppers from outside the province sharply decreased. 
•  Many former opium-cultivating households in central irrigated area reported having not cultivated in 2005, or much reduced 
amount. Access to land for sharecroppers not an apparent constraint even where opium poppy area has declined, reflecting 
relatively large landholding sizes. 
•  Availability of cash for work paid through USAID at $4 per day for 50–60 days providing a significant amount of cash, 
helping to keep seasonal migration numbers down.  
•  Some cultivators able to clear debts while others not. 
•  Situation in north Helmand different: less secure irrigation systems (karez) and limited land areas. Traditionally grain-deficit 
villages with livestock production and migratory practices a part of portfolio of livelihood strategies. Opium poppy area more 
in evidence, if reduced. Household debt levels possibly greater, for example mortgaging of land (and little opportunity for 
sharecropping). With limited livestock numbers, cash for work on karez cleaning, although substantial while available, 
appears to be providing little more than a holding operation, after which migration will be necessary. 
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IV.  Alternative Livelihoods: Emerging Issues
An end state not a programme 
Given the limited success of previous 
alternative development projects in 
Afghanistan, and with a range of national 
programmes aiming to deliver a wide array of 
services including social and physical 
infrastructure, credit and agricultural support, a 
more strategic approach is needed. The 
government of Afghanistan’s Counter Narcotics 
Strategy demands that “the provision of 
development assistance to opium poppy 
growing areas is undertaken in the framework 
of the National Development Programmes”, 
and it has outlined a range of interventions that 
will contribute to establishing the necessary 
socioeconomic, legal and political conditions in 
which a farmer will no longer need to cultivate 
opium poppy. 
Unfortunately the Counter Narcotics Strategy 
designates alternative livelihoods as one of its 
eight pillars along with others such as inter-
diction and eradication, rather than setting it as 
a goal to be achieved through the appropriate 
targeting and sequencing of eradication, 
interdiction and conventional development 
assistance. With alternative livelihoods defined 
as a means rather than an end, it is easier to 
press donors to increase their financial 
commitment to the “neglected” alternative 
livelihoods sector to show their commitment to 
counter narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. It has 
also become easier to overlook the kinds of 
“best practice” that are required to design and 
implement effective development programmes 
once alternative livelihood programmes 
become primarily about achieving drug control 
objectives and not development outcomes. 
The expediency associated with alternative 
livelihoods programming is at its most stark 
when programmes are charged with 
responding to the consequences of this year’s 
dramatic reduction in opium poppy cultivation – 
a task they cannot adequately perform given 
the role that opium poppy plays in rural 
livelihood strategies and the limited scale and 
pace of the development impact of these 
programmes. There is real danger that if 
cultivation increases in 2006, it will be the 
alternative livelihoods programming strand that 
will be blamed for not delivering sustained 
reductions in levels of cultivation – a measure 
against which it cannot be judged, particularly 
when the scope of the programmes that fall 
under this banner is considered. 
Badging of programmes as alternative 
livelihoods 
Under pressure to respond to the Afghan 
government’s efforts to deliver a rapid reduction 
in opium poppy cultivation this year (which has 
partly been a response to external demands), 
the donor community has looked to boost its 
financial support for what are increasingly being 
referred to as “alternative livelihood 
programmes”. 
For those donors working through the National 
Development Budget these programmes have 
been easier to fund now that National Priority 
Programmes such as MISFA (Microfinance 
Investment Support Facility in Afghanistan), 
NEEP (National Emergency Employment 
Programme) and NSP (National Solidarity 
Programme) have been categorised as 
alternative livelihoods programmes. While 
some of these programmes have gone through 
a genuine process of assessing how they might 
best address the causes of opium poppy 
cultivation (such as MISFA with its establish-
ment of a pilot opium debt refinancing 
package), for others it is business as usual. 
More and more, any development being under-
taken in a poppy-growing area is becoming 
known as “alternative livelihoods”. 
There is some truth to this claim. The NSP not 
only sometimes creates employment 
opportunities, but it also seeks to contribute to 
building the social contract between 
communities and state that has proven so 
important in other illicit drug crop-producing 
countries. NEEP rehabilitates much-needed 
infrastructure and creates employment 
opportunities in the rural economy. 
However, these national programmes are often 
not implemented in the same communities or 
even the same districts. While households in a 
village may benefit from some improved 
infrastructure and employment provided by 
NEEP, they may not have established local 
decision-making bodies and received a block 
grant from NSP, or have improved access to 
credit through MISFA. Other sectoral 
interventions such as irrigation and agriculture 
may well be completely absent. It cannot be 
expected that a uni-sectoral intervention will Briefing Paper Series  Alternative Livelihoods: Substance or Slogan? 
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solve the development needs of a community, 
nor can it be expected that a single national 
programme will develop an “alternative 
livelihood” given the multifunctional role that 
opium poppy plays in rural livelihood strategies. 
If NEEP and NSP are to be included as 
alternative livelihoods programmes, why not the 
provision of schools and curriculum develop-
ment? In the highlands of Thailand this has 
been critical in building the social contract and 
establishing legal and social norms amongst 
illicit drug crop-producing families. Why is the 
planned National Priority Programme for Skills 
and Market Linkages not included, given that in 
many of the areas in which opium poppy is 
most concentrated, population densities are 
high and the agricultural potential is limited? No 
other crop can provide the land-based 
economy that opium poppy does in such areas, 
and experience in other opium-producing 
countries suggests that out-migration has been 
instrumental in reducing opium poppy 
cultivation. 
While an approach of badging development in 
poppy-growing areas as alternative livelihoods 
may appear attractive in the short term –
bringing in funds for under-financed develop-
ment programmes and showing financial 
commitment to the counter narcotics effort – in 
the longer term it could prove counter-
productive. Experience in Latin America has 
shown that faced with criticism from drug 
control policymakers towards high spending in 
illicit drug-growing areas, and questions over 
the effect interventions have had on levels of 
cultivation, the common response has been to 
make assistance conditional on reductions in 
hectarage, rather than to make a more 
concerted effort to address the drivers of opium 
poppy or coca cultivation.
5 A possible 
resurgence in opium poppy cultivation in 
Afghanistan in the 2005–06 growing season is 
likely to result in such a policy response, as 
those who have funded “alternative livelihoods 
programmes” look for the “drug control” returns 
on their investments. The fact that many of 
these interventions on the ground may 
represent only a single-sector response to a 
community could well be overlooked when 
policymakers aggregate the total expenditure 
on “alternative livelihoods programmes”. 
                                                 
5 United States General Accounting Office, “Drug Control: Efforts to 
Develop Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit Crops in Colombia Have 
Made Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles”, GAO-02-291. 
Impact not commitments, and the  
re-emergence of conditionality 
Recently there has been mounting focus on the 
amount of funding that has been committed to 
alternative livelihoods programmes. Figures 
released by UNODC
6 estimate that US$490m 
has been committed to alternative livelihoods 
programmes in 2005–06. Given the lack of 
clarity about what constitutes an alternative 
livelihoods programme, it remains to be seen 
what interventions have been included under 
this headline figure. Furthermore, regardless of 
definition it is unclear how much of this funding 
has actually been disbursed, particularly in the 
southern region of Afghanistan where security 
remains a concern. What is even more difficult 
to define is the effect this assistance has had 
on the lives and livelihoods of farmers given the 
current dearth of impact monitoring. 
It appears that correlation has become 
confused with causality, as some policymakers 
have sought to explain low levels of cultivation 
as a function of the levels of development 
assistance provided, rather than recognise that 
this year’s commitments have largely been a 
reaction to the Afghan government’s efforts to 
produce dramatic reductions in opium poppy 
cultivation. 
It would seem that questionable analysis of 
both levels of expenditure and causal 
relationships are informing renewed calls for 
making development assistance conditional on 
communities’ reduction of levels of opium 
poppy cultivation.
7 This takes little notice of the 
well-documented failings of conditionality in 
Afghanistan
8 and in other illicit drug-producing 
source countries.
9 
Incorporating the “drivers” of opium poppy 
cultivation 
While there is an attempt by the government 
and some donors to distinguish between 
alternative livelihoods programmes (which 
presumably are more directly targeted at 
reducing levels of opium poppy cultivation) and 
conventional development programmes, there 
                                                 
6 UNODC, 2005, “The Opium Situation in Afghanistan as of 29 
August 2005”, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afghanistan_2005/opium-
afghanistan_2005-08-26.pdf, p. 4 
7 UNODC recommends “A commitment by farming communities to 
refrain from drug cultivation in exchange for greater development 
assistance”, The Opium Situation in Afghanistan, p. 10. 
8 See David Mansfield, 2002, “The Failure of Quid Pro Quo: 
Alternative Development in Afghanistan”, papers prepared for the 
International Conference on Alternative Development in Drug 
Control and Cooperation, Feldafing, Germany, 7–12 January 2002. 
9 See Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 28 February 2005, Alternative 
Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation, Final Synthesis 
Report, E/CN.7/2005/CRP.3, p. 12–13, 
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is little effort to ensure that the former actually 
address the structural (such as agro-ecological, 
socioeconomic) or institutional (such as risk 
and uncertainty) factors that influence farmers 
in their decision to cultivate opium poppy. 
The lack of a common understanding of the 
causes of opium poppy cultivation within the 
development community is well illustrated by 
the recent agricultural sector priorities for 
alternative livelihoods produced by the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Food and 
the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation for 
1385–86 (2006–07): 
The term “Alternative Livelihoods” recognises 
that the struggle against opium production in 
Afghanistan will be achieved through 
mainstream rural development…This principle is 
recognised by all rational experts in the field, 
based on experiences in other countries. It has 
been clearly expressed in relation specifically to 
Afghanistan by the prize-winning agricultural 
economist, John Mellor: the strategies one 
would apply to counter opium production are the 
same ones that one would apply to achieve 
broad-based rural development. 
There seems to be little recognition in the 
above statement that while broad-based rural 
development is necessary, it does not 
sufficiently address the specific drivers of 
opium poppy cultivation. Many alternative 
livelihoods interventions target the landed and 
those in areas with high potential for 
agricultural production. Those who have 
previously gained access to land through 
sharecropping opium poppy would only seem 
to gain from this shift to licit cultivation by 
obtaining the same share of a larger final yield 
of whatever replacement crops are produced. 
Where replacement crops are less labour 
intensive than opium poppy (as is usually the 
case) the land poor will find it increasingly 
difficult to access any land at all. There is a 
potential for the land poor to lose out signifi-
cantly from a shift in cultivation patterns – 
losing access to land, on- and off-farm income, 
and credit – prompting relocation of both 
people and opium poppy cultivation to 
neighbouring areas. 
Similarly, little consideration is given to those 
areas where both land and irrigation are 
scarce, opium poppy is at its most concentrated 
and agricultural potential is limited. Linkages 
with interventions targeted at the land poor – 
such as labour-intensive agro-processing, 
vocational training, land reform, or improving 
access to agricultural inputs – could all contri-
bute to addressing this risk, but are currently 
not explored. The assumption is very much that 
the benefits will somehow trickle down to those 
most dependent on opium poppy cultivation. 
Many alternative livelihood interventions have a 
narrow focus on economic alternatives within a 
model of idealised market structures
10. They 
reduce the livelihood concept to that of income, 
microeconomics and farmers as profit 
maximisers, and assume that this will be 
sufficient; this is too limited. The content of 
programmes needs to be much broader to 
address the reasons why opium poppy is 
cultivated and the motivating forces and risks 
that different actors face. 
In sum, not only is there very limited analysis of 
the structural (natural, economic and social) 
dimensions of the drivers of the opium 
economy in agricultural sector priorities, but the 
institutional and agent (capacity and action of 
individuals to make choices) analysis is also 
inadequate. The evidence from Nangarhar and 
Helmand shows how critical these dimensions 
are, and how a failure to address them may 
compound rather than resolve them. 
These issues are further illustrated in the 
irrigation sector where interventions may have 
impact on those who cultivate opium poppy and 
the levels of cultivation. Without the requisite 
interlinkages with programmes aimed at 
extending the provision of credit, agricultural 
services and vocational training, as well as the 
roll out of governance and law and order, there 
is every possibility that increasing the amount 
of land under irrigation could also increase the 
amount of land cultivated with opium poppy. 
This is not to say that the Afghan government 
and the international community should not 
give priority to irrigation, but that a thorough 
analysis of the different socioeconomic groups 
involved in opium poppy cultivation, how they 
will benefit and lose from a programme, and 
what their likely responses will be, is required to 
make a full assessment of the likely counter 
narcotics and development impact of a 
programme. This will also identify what 
measures can be incorporated to reduce the 
threat of the relocation (or indeed the 
expansion) of opium poppy cultivation.  
                                                 
10 See S. Lister and A. Pain, 2004, Trading in Power: The Politics of 
“Free” Markets in Afghanistan, Kabul: Afghanistan Research and 
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Fragmented planning 
The need to understand and respond to the 
different drivers of opium poppy cultivation, and 
the recognition that these differ according to 
context, have also led to attempts to decen-
tralise the development planning process. The 
European Commission in particular, through its 
work with GTZ, has pressed for a more decen-
tralised approach to the planning of develop-
ment interventions, to reduce opium poppy 
cultivation through piloting work in Nangarhar at 
the district level. The Badakhshan Develop-
ment Forum has also tried to bring different 
development actors together to try to map who 
is doing what and identify how greater syner-
gies might be established in order to maximise 
development and counter narcotics impact. 
However, the move to a more comprehensive 
regional or provincial development plan in 
which counter narcotics analyses and 
objectives are mainstreamed continues to 
remain elusive. Not only is there a lack of clarity 
about the government’s position on coordinated 
planning, it seems there are still too many 
agencies pursuing their own, sometimes 
conflicting, objectives to allow for better 
strategic direction and coordination of 
development plans at the district and provincial 
level. Various agencies have adopted different 
implementing partners at the provincial level: 
some are working through governors’ offices 
(despite governors’ lack of formal authority over 
line agencies), while others are working 
through individual line ministries. At the policy 
level these interventions, although located in 
the same province, may have contradictory 
views on key issues such as “conditionality”. 
The National Priority Programmes working in 
Nangarhar, for example, have no policy 
position on conditionality at all. This confusion 
continues despite the common position agreed 
at the Alternative Livelihoods Working Group 
meeting in June 2004, which established 
milestones for provincial-based development 
planning by which the efforts of provincial and 
local authorities could be judged, including 
improvements in security, corruption, 
administrative reform, disarmament and 
counter narcotics. 
Perhaps the recent establishment of a common 
framework for development assistance 
intended to contribute to an alternative 
livelihood outcome, the nascent Alternative 
Livelihoods Implementation Plan (ALIP), will 
provide the vehicle for greater cohesion in both 
policy development and the implementation of 
development interventions at the national and 
provincial levels. This effort will be supported 
by the development of the Interim Afghan 
National Development Strategy and it is 
important that counter narcotics efforts are 
mainstreamed both within this and any post-
Bonn Compact agreed with the international 
community. However, if greater coordination is 
to be achieved, immediate consideration will 
need to be given to identifying the appropriate 
mechanisms for developing provincial and 
district development plans within a common 
national framework. The current mosaic of 
disparate programmes and implementing 
agencies operating at the district and provincial 
level does not seem to make the most effective 
use of scarce resources in the pursuit of either 
development or drug control achievements. 
V. Ways  Forward
There are significant dangers in using 
alternative livelihoods as a means of 
implementing the counter narcotics agenda. 
Elimination of opium poppy is being pursued at 
a dramatic rate, using opium area statistics 
more as an indicator of dealing with the causes 
of the disease rather than as a symptom of 
them. In the process, this pursuit is 
marginalising the rural poor both economically 
and politically. Policymakers from the drug 
control field and observers at the international 
level must temper their expectations of what 
fast-tracked “alternative livelihoods” can deliver. 
So far, alternative livelihoods programmes, 
impact monitoring in national programmes, and 
applied research have not generated a clear 
understanding of what influences households in 
their decision to move from illicit to licit 
livelihoods and how this differs by socio-
economic and gender group, as well as 
location. Moreover, models of behavioural 
change on which interventions and 
programming have been based give undue 
weight to individual choice and insufficient 
attention to the context within that choice is 
made. Greater priority should be given to 
generating knowledge building and to skilling-
up both development and drug control 
professionals so that counter narcotics can be Briefing Paper Series  Alternative Livelihoods: Substance or Slogan? 
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effectively mainstreamed within the 
government’s National Development Strategy. 
While care must be taken in drawing lessons 
from other drug contexts, some examples of 
what has been found not to work
11 are relevant, 
and include: 
•  Directly linking alternative livelihoods to law 
enforcement measures; lessons on the 
ineffectiveness of coercion as an 
instrument of policy can also be drawn from 
the history of forestry management in 
South Asia, where policing the forest failed 
to prevent the decline in forest resources 
and even exacerbated the problem
12; 
•  Using conditionality criteria in the 
disbursement of funding; 
•  Separating programmes and projects from 
broader development planning; and 
•  Minimal use of participatory processes; the 
strong emphasis on project delivery and 
achievement of opium area reduction has 
given little, if any, opportunity to build 
consensual agreement on behavioural 
change. Participatory processes would 
imply that outcomes are negotiable. Their 
absence is in part because of the emphasis 
that has been given to economic motiva-
tions rather than to contexctual factors 
influencing how individuals can behave. 
Useful lessons on the building of partici-
patory processes can again be drawn from 
forestry policy as well as poverty reduction 
strategies. 
There is a clear need to deploy a broad range 
of multisectoral instruments to respond to the 
drivers of the opium economy, each of which is 
necessary but not sufficient on its own. The key 
considerations in which balance, synergy and 
appropriate sequencing must be sought 
include: 
•  Addressing the governance environment 
that creates the risk and uncertainty making 
it rational for households to grow opium 
poppy because the illicit economy is seen 
to be more predictable and less risky than 
the licit one; 
•  Ensuring that there is a balance in 
interventions between high- and low-
                                                 
11 Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 2005, Alternative Development: A 
Global Thematic Evaluation, Final Synthesis Report 
12 N, Sundar, 2000, “Unpacking the ‘Joint’ in Joint Forest 
Management”, Development and Change, 31:255–79 
 
potential areas as determined by access to 
markets and agro-ecology. This will mean 
not only appropriate investment according 
to location, but also greater attention to 
context-specific programming informed by 
an analysis of how and where opium poppy 
production will retreat to and persist when it 
is under pressure; 
•  Paying particular attention to the needs of 
the poor who have less room to 
manoeuvre; this will require a move away 
from production-based interventions to a 
longer-term focus on employment and 
opportunities for off- and non-farm 
activities; 
•  Developing effective monitoring systems 
must be a central element of the alternative 
livelihoods approach – these are 
fundamental to building knowledge 
management systems. Delivery of 
programme inputs is not enough; 
monitoring systems must be established 
that seek to build evidence of positive and 
durable change having been brought about. 
The burden of proof that viable alternative 
livelihoods exist and are accessible lies not 
with the poor but with the implementers –
conditionality must be reversed. 
Understanding the processes by which 
households move from illicit to licit 
livelihoods is critical to policy development, 
as well as to programme design and 
implementation. 
Through strategic interventions supported by a 
robust evidence base of “what works” and well-
targeted advocacy with key actors, it will be 
possible to bring the full forces (and funding) of 
the development community to bear on counter 
narcotics – not simply pursuing the “business 
as usual” model of rural development that is 
most commonly applied at present. 
Recommendations 
The hype for “alternative livelihoods” flowing 
through Kabul is based on a virtual alternative 
livelihoods model: the promise of what it could 
become rather than what it already is. Specific 
recommendations that could contribute to 
giving substance and credibility to an 
alternative livelihoods approach include: 
• Undertaking  robust  analysis of the drivers 
of opium poppy production (and how they 
change over time) that is context-specific 
and pays attention to structures, institutions 
and actors. It must be used to inform Briefing Paper Series  Alternative Livelihoods: Substance or Slogan? 
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programming design and this must be 
linked to ongoing micro-level analysis of the 
spatial and temporal changes in opium 
poppy cultivation; 
•  Building analysis and programming content 
that responds to variability in agro-
ecological potential, market access and the 
needs and resources of different socio-
economic actors engaged in production;  
•  Making reform of governance structures at 
provincial and district level a necessary 
condition for building sustainable 
alternative livelihoods and other elements 
of the counter narcotics strategy. This may 
well be compatible with the initial targeting 
of areas with a short history of opium poppy 
cultivation rather than those conventionally 
associated most closely with drug crop 
production; 
•  Establishing alternative livelihoods as a 
long-term goal and not an instrumental 
means of achieving a reduction in the area 
under opium poppy in the short term; 
•  Paying particular attention to participatory 
processes at all levels in order to build a 
constituency of support for alternative 
livelihoods and its role in the counter 
narcotics strategy. Mixing coercion (such 
as linking eradication and interdiction) with 
development assistance through forms of 
conditionality is likely to be counter-
productive, particularly where there is a 
deep history of cultivation; 
•  Building and using monitoring systems as a 
critical component of alternative livelihoods 
programming: impact must not be assumed 
from delivery, and high standards of 
evidence should be expected; and 
•  Giving priority to skilling-up both 
development and drug control 
professionals so that counter narcotics can 
be effectively mainstreamed within the 
government’s National Development 
Strategy. Briefing Paper Series  Alternative Livelihoods: Substance or Slogan? 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit  14 
 
The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) is an independent research organisation 
that conducts and facilitates action-oriented research and learning that informs and influences 
policy and practice. AREU also actively promotes a culture of research and learning by 
strengthening analytical capacity in Afghanistan and by creating opportunities for analysis, 
thought and debate. Fundamental to AREU’s vision is that its work should improve Afghan lives.  
AREU was established by the assistance community working in Afghanistan and has a board of 
directors with representation from donors, UN and multilateral agencies and NGOs. 
Current funding for AREU is provided by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA), the European Commission (EC), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), Stichting Vluchteling (SV), the World Bank, the United Kingdom Department for 
International Development (DFID), and the governments of Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
Denmark. 
For more information and to order publications, contact AREU: 
Charahi Ansari (opposite the Insaf Hotel and Popolano’s restaurant) 
Shahr-e Naw, Kabul, Afghanistan 
telephone +93 (0)79 608 548 website  www.areu.org.af email areu@areu.org.af 
 